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ABSTRACT
Changes in water use patterns are an inevitable consequence
of relentless social transformations taking place.
Especially where
waters have been fully appropriated, the needs of a dynamic society
must be met through transfers in water ownership.
Yet, there are a
variety of factors that may operate as impediments to the shifting of
water according to social preferences as expressed through water
markets.
As a mechanism for facilitating water transfers, exchanges,
or rentals, the concept of "water banking" and "water brokering" may
be fruitful.
This report appraises the potential for initiating and
operating such a service within the legal, institutional, and organizational framework prevailing in Utah.

•

Questions addressed are:
What are the special characteristics
of water rights and water right owners that constitute important
elements of the market arena?
How would a banking and/or brokering
service effectively deal with the mix of marketable water right
equities ranging from the "general corporate right" (exercised in
satisfying an unlimited variety of individual uses at the pleasure of
the corporation, Le. municipality, conservancy district, etc.); the
individual proportion or "share" of a mutually owned right; to the
individually owned water right? How would the water banking operation
be coordinated with the State Engineer who must approve all changes in
use?
What are the organizational alternatives for establishing a
water bank?
Should such a service be sponsored and operated as a
public or private activity?
What are the legal considerations that
must be addressed? Are there constitutional, statutory, or procedural
considerations that seriously constrain the operation of a water
banking/brokering service?
Can such a service be made to complement
present institutional structures and whatever forms of banking and
brokering they may currently provide? What are the economic considerations in the creation of a water banking/brokering service?
It is concluded that a water bank could be effective in facilitating cost-effective and resource efficient matchups of buyers and
sellers of water.
There are no constitutional, statutory, or regulative elements in Utah water administration that would seriously hinder
the operation of a water banking/brokering system. However, there are
some institutional peculiarities and debt encumbrances that may limit
the market potential of particular water right equities. The protection of third party interests to any water rights transact ion is a
central consideration in arranging water transfers, exchanges, or
rentals.
Therefore, the water bank must be staffed by individuals
having technical understanding of the hydrologic and legal impacts
and the economic externali ties that accompany particular water use
changes.

..

An appraisal of existing Utah organizations capable of assuming
a water banking/brokering service suggest the Office of the State
Engineer (public) and the Utah Water Users Association (private) as
the two most likely candidates. It is recommended that the evaluation
of these two organizations now be made in more detail with respect to
suitability of the new banking/brokering service to basic mission,
current operating policies and programs, organizational structure, and
fiscal and budgetary framework.
Decision to initiate the concept
should probably begin with a limited level of service, adding more
comprehensive and more professional elements as justified by operating
experience.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Social Dynamics and Water R e a l l o c a t i o n . .
Water Banking/Brokering as a Means of Expediting
Water Transfers
. .
. . .
. .
. .
Special Characteristics of Water Rights and the Market
Arena.
Purpose and Scope of Analyses
II. OPERATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS

1
3
4
5

Operational Considerations

5

Activities and Services
Candidates to Provide a Banking/Brokering
Service .
Coordination with State Engineer .
Organizational Alternatives
Evaluation of Existing Water Management
Organizations.
.
.
Alternative Organizational Structure
Administrative Considerations

5
6
6
6
7
7
9

III. HYDROLOGIC/ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS

11

Water Transfers and Third Party Impacts .
Hydrologic Unity and Water Use Inhomogeneity

11
11

IV. LEGAL FEASIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS

13

Constitutional Implications of Water Transfers
and Exchanges .
.
Statutory Considerations
Limitations on Speculation.
.
.
Due Diligence and Use Requirements
.
Forfeiture and Abandonment Implications
The Discretionary Authority of the State
Engineer
.
.
.
. .
. .
Initial Appropriation Conditions .
The Change-of-Use Procedure
Public Interest and Water Quality Factors

V.

1

13
15
15
17
17
18
18
18
20
21

INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

21
22

Water Ownership Hierarchy .
'"
Institutional Constraints to Water Marketing
VI. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CREATION OF A WATER
BANKING/BROKERING SERVICE .

23
23

Market Information . . .
. .
.
.
Current Levels of Water Transfer Activity
Economic Feasibility of a Water Rights
Banking Service

24

Costs.
.
Benefits.
.
. .
.
.
.
. .
Financial Feasibility of a Water Rights Banking
Service .
~

v

23

.

25
25
26

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
Page
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

29
29

Conc Ius ions
Recommendations

30

REFERENCES

33

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1

Page
Comparisons of existing water management organizations
in Utah with respect to qualifications for assuming a
water banking function

8

2

Applications received, processed, and action taken

24

3

Summary of water brokering and banking functions

30

vi

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Water Right - The entitlement to use surface
or underground water for a beneficial
purpose as evidenced by a certificate
of appropriation, by a judicial decree,
or by diligence claims.
May be transferred by deed in substantially the
same manner as real estate.
May be
represented by shares of stock in a
corporation.

right between two ~r more parties.
Requires that particular buyers and
sellers, lessors or lessees, both
agree to the terms of the transfer.
Broker has no proprietory control
over water right'. eqUities involved
but serves as a go-between.
Water Allocation - The distribution of water
use entitlements among applicants under
the prior appropriation doctrine and
through the appropriation process. Allocations continue over time according
to economic market forces subject to
State Engineer tests of beneficial use,
impairment of existing rights, public
interest, etc.

Water Appropriation - The process whereby
unappropriated public waters of a
state are acquired for private use
upon application to the State Engineer.
The appropriation must be for some
useful or beneficial purpose, and
appropriators have priority among
themselves according to the dates of
their respective appropriations.
Proposed use of the applicant must not
impair existing rights, interfere with
more beneficial uses, nor prove detrimental to the public welfare. The
prosposed plan of use must demonstrate
economic and financial feasibility.

Hydrologic Externalities - Refers to the
changes in flow characteristics that
result external to the site where
a particular change in water use or
management is initiated.
Because
of the interconnection of all surface
and subsurface waters of a river baSin,
moving in a downhill direction, the
effects of diversion, regulation,
or treatment at a particular point are
transmitted into flow characteristics
at downstream locations. The projection
of hydrologic externali ties are the
basis for determining the impact on
existing water rights reSUlting from any
proposed change in water use.

Equity Interest in Water - A legal term for
ownership or partial ownership in a
water right.
R~!~_Banking

- Connotes a proprietory
management of a "pool" of water equities
with disgressionary authority to accept
individual "deposits" of water entitlement and make individual lease or purchase arrangements for waters "held
in trust."
Managing a "stock" of
water to the satisfaction of individual
water borrowers and lenders or buyers
and sellers of equity interests.

Conditioning Costs - Costs commonly entailed
in shifting water from one use to
another in addit ion to the purchase
price of the water right itself.
In
converting from one use to another the
quality, quantity, timing, and ~ocation
a1 characteristics may need modification
or conditioning to make them conform to
requirements of the new use.

Water Brokering
Connotes a negotiated
transferring of a specific property

vii

I.

INTRODUCTION

Social Dynamics and Water Reallocation

Water law in Utah is suffiCiently
flexible to permit orderly shifts of water
from one use to another.
Subject to the
administrative controls of the State Engineer, water rights can be bought and sold to
achieve water ·reallocations among competing
demands. Each buyer makes his own canvas of
potential sources of supply and proceeds to
negotiate the terms of procurement for the
supply believed to be most readily adapted to
the intended use.
The State Engineer
must approve any resulting wa·ter rights
transfers and is thus in contact with buyers
and sellers of water providing a public
"water brokering" service of sorts. However,
the State Engineer's role in most water
transactions is more that of a "referee" than
that of an "arranger" such as a realtor or
broker of real estate.
His primary concern
is to ascertain the hydrologic and legal
consequences of any proposed transfer so that
potential conflicts between and among
water right holders can be mitigated before
the transfer takes place. Buyers and sellers
of water generally do not view the State
Engineer as an informational storehouse about
water markets. The State Engineer is generally not directly involved in the initial
private negotiations between buyers and
sellers.
He examines transfer agreements
between willing buyers and sellers to insure
conformity to legal requirements and prevailing administrative policy and procedure once
an official change application is submitted.
He hears and considers comments and protests
from all parties who have an interest or feel
their water rights may be adversely affected
by a proposed water transfer.
However,
as a quasi-judicial officer, the State
Engineer does not participate directly in the
water marketing process.

Economic and social change give rise to
changes in water supply and use patterns.
New uses with different quantity, quality,
timing, and location requirements entail
modification/expansion of delivery systems
and/or transfers, shifts, or exchanges in
resource ownership. When fully appropriated
in a socially dynamic environment, water can
continue to serve its role as an essential
ingredient or catalyst in the attainment of
social well-being goals only if it is convertible or transferable to uses according
to contemporary priorities. Thus, providing
an easy and advantageous transfer of water to
emerging higher valued uses is essential lest
water become limiting to the achievement of
economic and social goals.
In general, the
market is the process by which water transfers are accomplished.
A variety of legal and institutional
factors are generally perceived to impede the
transfer of water through market forces.
Similarly, the peculiarities of the water
marketing arena and possible weaknesses in
marketing mechanisms have been identified as
explanations of sluggishness in water transfers to a steadily growing;. array of higher
value use.rs and uses. (1)
The concept of
"water banking" and "water brokering" offers
potential for improving the water marketing
function by providing a centralized source of
information about specific water availability
and specific water needs such that market
participants have better recognition of
options available. Such an informational
repository presumably would also provide a
better derivation of the social value of
water.
For any given water rights transaction,
private legal or engineering advice may be
sought by one or both parties to provide
assurance that the transaction is physically
sound and legally correct. However, such aid
is usually without the complete informational
base to expose the full array of alternate
supply options and provide advice concerning
selection of the one best suited to the
expressed need. Hence, a water brokering
service may be a useful device for assembling
information about water availability and
water need and making such information
broadly available for the use of those
wanting to buy, sell, or rent water.

Water Banking/Brokering as a Means
of Expediting Water Transfers
The term water banking/brokering, as
employed in this study, represents a centralized mechanism for expediting the transfer of equity interests in water.
Many
different kinds of equity transfer and equity
exchange situations would be included in this
concept.
The "water bank ing" concept would apply
where there exists a "proprietorship" over a
water "pool."
For example, if assets or
negotiables of the bank consist of subscriptions for water deliveries, .ith the proprietorship having discretionary authority to
supply all kinds of users within its corporate boundaries, then the operation fits the
description of a water bank. Such operating

(1) Ange ledes, Sort iros, and Bugene Bardach.
Water Banking:
How to Stop Wasting Agricultural
Water.
Institute for Contemporary Studies, San
Francisco, Calif. 1978.

1

Water transfers can be expedited by
making water availabilities more generally
visible to prospective buyers, providing
analytic reviews and assurances, and advising
on physical and legal preconditions to be met
before needed official approval of any
proposed transfer is obtained. As a central
clearinghouse of information about water
avai labi li ty and water need or demand, a
water bank or broker may help in organizing
water rights "packages" to meet specifically
expressed needs.

flexibility, constrained only by the physical
limitations of storing and conveying water to
the satisfaction of customers within its
operating territory, should allow subscribers
to place entitlements on deposit for possible
use by others who can afford the "rental
fee.
Individual lessors and lessees would
need only deal with the bank. The subscript ions themselves and obligat ions associated
with them could remain intact. However, the
bank might repossess the subscription
outright if a particular subscriber has
outlived its need. The important distinguishing feature of a water bank would be
that it manage a "stock" of water dealing
wi th both borrowers and lenders, buyers and
sellers, separately and individually.
Managing a kind of corporate water supply
would offer flexibility to tailor amounts and
locations of supply according to market
demand.
Since the stock of water under the
jurisdiction of the proprietor is not internally encumbered in the transfer process by
constraints on the place and nature of use
and point of diversion as with individual
water rights, it would be p.ossible to operate
in a banking mode. Tests of beneficial use,
forfeiture, and third party impacts that
pertain to transfers of the right itself are
not operative for transfers taking place
internal to a corporate right.
II

The justification for water banking/
broker ing services must be found in demonstrated advantage to the public in 1)
increasing the level of information and
awareness between entities desiring to
purchase or sell water interests; 2) reducing the transfer costs involved in
such water interest transfers (i. e., legal
fees, search costs, etc.); 3) fostering a
better accommodation of public interest
criteria and standards so that the social
utility of water use is upgraded in each
transaction with lessened likelihood of
speculative or monopolistic advantage at
public expense or subsidy; and 4) utilizing
the transfer process to correct existing
imperfections in older water rights awards to
bring their definitions in line with present
standards of description and water duty.
Therefore, a primary role of a water banking/
brokering service would be to provide, a
"brokering" service for water equities
somewhat analogous to a realtor in arranging transfers of real estate equities.

Water brokering, on the other hand,
connotes a negotiated transfer of a well
defined property right between two or more
parties. The broker is not a participant in
the transaction and buyers and sellers
must both be satisfied with terms or the
transrer-will not take place. Unlike the
situation where individual users are supplied
out of a single large water right in the name
of the corporate entity, transactions regarding individual water rights cannot avoid
considerations of third party impacts to the
transaction.

Obviously, a water banking/brokerage
function would find more application in areas
of rapid demographic transition (urbanizing
areas). In isolated and stable agricultural
areas where water users have a close acquaintenship with one another and where
water ownership transfers can only occur
between shareholders on an intra-company
basis, a regional or statewide water banking
system would be of limited value.
In such
situations, a bank (broker) could not materially improve the awareness of potential
buyers and sellers as to availability and
need.
Nor could a centralized bank do much
to lessen the costs of making an intracompany water rights transaction.
On the
other hand, a large new enterprise (i.e.,
energy development) proposing to locate in an
otherwise water stable area, may induce very
substantial, complex, and far reaching
economic, social, or environmental impacts
requiring utilization of a range of services
a water bank/broker could provide.
Such
service might be of advantage not only to· the
immediate and affected parties, but to the
entire state as well.
For episodic changes
in water use, wherever proposed, all parties
to a water transaction may benefit from the
services of a water bank operated in close
liaison with the Office of the State Engineer
and the Division of Water Resources.

In actual practice, there are large
numbers of individual rights interspersed
throughout the domain of larger corporate
water supplying entities (such as water
conservancy districts). While the brokering
concept could be applied quite generally
throughout regions and the state as a whole,
the banking operation would be limited to
situations where a proprietorship opportunity
exists. The basic distinction between water
banking and water brokering lies in the
proprietorship feature. Unless an entity has
some entrepreneurial authority over a supply
serving large numbers and varieties of retail
users it could not operate as a water bank in
the sense that the term is used in this
study. While it is necessary to keep in mind
the differences between water banking and
water brokering, it is also necessary to
recognize that any given region in Utah will
contain a mix of banking and brokering
opportunities.
Therefore, much of the
discussion pertains to either or both of the
concepts and distinctions are not rigorously
emphasized.

It

service,
2

is quite possible that a banking
formally and appropriately coordi-

nated with the Office of the State Engineer,
could keep that office cont inuously updated
regarding stirrings in the water market.
Current knowledge of interest in buying or
selling water could provide the State Engineer (and the state in general) with some
advance indication of water transfer potent ials with which he may ultimately have to
deal.
The bank could serve a useful purpose
in alerting parties to a transaction early in
the negotiating stage of conditions that must
be met for the transfer to be acceptable to
the State Engineer. Where the State Engineer
is asked to approve a water rights transfer
whose terms have been painstakingly worked
out between the part ies involved but which
turns out not to meet the necessary conditions for State Engineer approval, a
painful adjustment may be imposed upon the
negotiators.

water transaction.
Certification of the
validity of the water right being conveyed
(similar to title insurance in real estate
transactions) might be provided as a part of
a banking/brokering service.
Uncertainty
of validity or status of a water right
of times creates major delay to a potential
transfer.
In many instances, a major obstacle to
the expeditious transfer of a water right
is the lack of knowledge of who buyers and
sellers are and the high information costs
associated with obtaining this market knowledge.
This lack of centralized source of
information on water transactions is painfully evident to a large enterprise that must
accumulate water from numerous individual
sources in order to obtain its required
supply.
Having a large information base
about buyers and sellers of water, water
brokerage would be well-suited for putting
together "packages" of water rights to suit
specific needs of buyers, or conversely, for
dispursing a large water ri.ht among a
disaggregated set of users.
Industrial or
commercial enterprises, unfamiliar with water
markets and the complexities of making water
right transfers, may find the services of a
bank/broker system most useful.
Net efficiency in water resource and capital utilization should then be increased through the
ability of the service to achieve improved
matchups between water availability and water
need.

There appears to be some opportunity to
make short term rentals of "surplus" water
through the auspices of a water bank/broker.
Grow,ing communities, for example, must plan
and build ahead of actual water needs.
Communities normally strive to provide ample
supplies so as to minimize the necessity of
imposing use restrictions while awaiting
completion of system enlargements.
For
example, through the operation of the Metropolitan Water District, Salt Lake City has
been able to provide water to county users
until such time as supplies are needed for
city purposes.
Some major water using
industries require a firm water supply so
that operations will not be jeopardized
during drought periods.
Consequently, they
hedge against hydrologic variations and
hydraulic system limitations by acquiring
a water supply whose flow in extremely dry
years will be sufficient to meet normal
needs.
Most water entitlements under such
water rights would be commonly in excess of
actual need and the "surplus" water could be
rented most years--certainly on an interruptible basis.
While such water may have a
relatively low rental value, the bank/broker
service may be instrumental in placing
this "insurance" water in more economically
productive interim use than may otherwise be
possible without such a service.

In short, if a water banking/brokerage
service could foster a more cost-effective
and resource efficient matchup between
buyers and sellers of water; and lessen
market distortions that occasionally occur
when information about supply options and
user potentials is limited; the water bank
would fill an important void.
In addition,
real value to the entire state in the form of
increased social benefit resulting from more
"optimum" transfers would result if the
brokerage system facilitated more systematic consideration of the public interest
issues involved in transfers.
Special Characteristics of Water
Rights and the Market Arena

Clearly, the value of a water banking/
brokerage service must be measured in terms
of profit in the eyes of clients who employ
the service. Generally, bringing more buyers
and sellers into a centralized "auction"
should not only reduce the individual
cost to search out prospective buyers or
sellers but also increase the likelihood of
finding the "highest bidder."
For the
purchaser, a centralized broker service
should provide a greater array of supply
options from which to choose, thereby improving the chances for obtaining the
most cost-effective solution to a water
acquisition problem.

Since water rights are treated much as
real property under the Utah law of appropriation, their transfer or exchange can be
fitted into the conceptual construct of water
banking and brokering as described above.
However, there are some very significant differences related to physical mobility, third
party impacts, and public interest concerns
pertaining to transfers of a "resource in
common" that temper the comparison with
other highly liquid property transactions
(money, commodities, stocks, etc.)
These
factors must be carefully considered in
analyzing the operation of a water banking/
brokering service.

Specialized personnel and possession of
a large informational base would tend to
reduce costs associated with completing a

A water right embodies a "commodity"
dimension (like a bushel of wheat or a

3

kilowatt of electricity) but it also (generally) connotes a continuing entitlement to
draw on the common supply in perpetuity.
Thus, it is not just the corpus of the water
that is bartered in a water market. Singular
focus on the commodi ty dimension has led to
common allegations that water pricing is
wrongly outside the market framework.
If
this were true, the idea of a water banking/
brokerage service would be seriously flawed.
I t is the legally protected water use right
that justifies long term investment in the
various enterprises to which water is essential.
Investment costs (incurred on the
basis of long time certainty of a water
supply and required for placing water in
beneficial use) become integral parts of
the water rights value. Succeeding transfers
of water rights necessarily include original
and subsequent nonseparable development
capital values. When all the investments
which have productive value and marketability
only so long as water is available are
properly capitalized into the transfer price
of a water right, then water transfers really
do occur in a market arena.
Thus, water
transactions do fit the general property
construct and conceptual framework to which a
banking/brokerage function could operate.

record with the the State Engineer--only the
corporate body.
The State Engineer is not
generally a party to intracompany trans fers
of equity interest.
Yet these "internal"
transfers are common and may wish to employ
the services of a bank or broker to expedite
the transaction.
Thus, a banking/brokering
system would have to be knowledgeable about
these "hierarchical" differences among
water rights; appreciate how they affect
the resolution with which the State Engineer
"sees" the impacts of water transfers within
the framework of a given water right (and
hence the necessity of his permission to make
a transfer); and understand how the operating
latitude of the banking/brokering service may
be influenced by these differences.
Purpose and Scope of Analyses
This study examines some significant
physical, legal, institutional, economic,
organizational, and operational elements that
need to be considered in determining whether
or not a water banking/brokerage service
should be established in Utah. The intent is
to make an objective assessment of how a
banking/brokering system would have to fit
within existing legal and institutional
structures.
The specific objectives are to
1) identify any legal-institutional impediments which would prevent or severely
limit implementation of a water banking/
brokerage system in Utah; 2) within the
limitations imposed by such impediments (or
the possible removal of them) identify
possible systems of water banking to include
organizational options and administrative
composition to manage such a service; and 3)
identify existing organizations which either
have, or could readily adopt, those operating
attributes that would appear to be essential
for successfully sustaining the water banking/brokering purpose.

In emphasizing the notion that water
rights transfers do conform to market principles when properly perceived, mention
should be made of one other feature of water
right ownership that complicates the transfer
process somewhat.
Individual water rights
differ greatly in terms of the kinds of use
allowed, amounts of water involved, etc.
Some water rights are identified with individual users.
Others are identified with a
"corporate" entity which, in turn, allocates
water to individual users within the corporation giving them valid proportional entitlements to the corporate right. However, these
individual portions are not a matter of

4

II.

OPERATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The operat ional, organizat ional, and
administrative framework would be pivotal in
the ultimate success or failure of a water
banking/brokerage service. If the service is
to achieve and maintain the focus and incent ive for voluntary negotiat ions between
willing buyers and sellers, its operating
interactions with 1) state water administrators, managers, and planners; 2) the hierarchy of local water management organizations;
and 3) individual appropriators would have to
be uniformly consistent and mutually constructive.
Perhaps a discussion of the operational, administrative, and organizational
considerations should proceed from an outline
of some of the important attributes or
operating criteria of a water bank, such as:
1.

Utilization of services should be
voluntary •.

2.

Operating policies and procedures
should be consistent and compatible
with existing statutes governing
the transfer and change in use of
water.

tain to all sources of supply
(groundwater, surface, etc.).
11.

Services should be available on a
statewide basis.

If the above requirements are valid, it
is clear that a banking/brokerage service
should not be expected to replace or disrupt
the free operation of markets for water. On
the contrary, the bank would need to function
so as to facilitate or supplement the normal
functioning of the market process. Authorities and operat ing rules of the bank would
have to mesh and synchronize with those of
the State Engineer.
There would have to be
adequate political, legal, fiscal, and
professional accountability in the operation
of the banking service.
This chapter
examines some of the important operational,
administrative, and organizational issues relating to a water banking/brokerage service.
Operational Considerations
Activities and Services

3.

Functions and authorities should
be compatible with, and complementary to, those of relevant state
agencies.

4.

The operation of the bank should result in a net positive social benefit (benefits greater than costs of
providing service).

5.

The bank should be free from any encumbrances or commitments that could
compromise objectivity in assisting
clientele.

6.

The bank should have no resp'onsibility or authority for formulating
state water policy (procedural
emphasis) •

7.

There must be adequate public accountability in the operation of the
bank.

8.

There must be adequate fiscal accountability in the operation of the
bank.

9.

The bank should have a mutually
constructive operating interaction
with existing water management and
water service organizations.

10.

Service should apply to all kinds of
recognized beneficial uses and per-

The primary activity of a water bank in
Utah would be in providing information needed
by buyers and sellers of equity interests in
water rights so that transfers could be
expedited.
Thus, the operation of the
bank/broker service would center around the
transfer process, aiming to make transactions
as efficient and orderly as possible.
In addition to facilitating transfers of
equity interests in water, a bank may be a
useful mechanism to expedite exchanges of
equity interests, where clients would be
benefited in so doing. Also, the bank might
become a useful device in helping clients
devise ways to integrate the use of storage
rights and direct flow rights and to "package" rights in ways to coordinate the use
of surface and groundwater rights.
Often water transactions are too complicated for buyers and sellers to work out
wi thout ass istance.
A knowledgeable water
banking entity accustomed to the water
negotiating process, may be able to mediate
and counsel in the development of coordinated
plans which upgrade the value of water rights
and the efficiency of water service among
users.
A bank ing/broker age sys tern lack ing
any vested or direct equity interests in the
negotiations would be especially effective in expediting water transfers that
involve complex physical and ownership
situations.
5

While the above activities relate
more to the brokering side, the service
might acquire water rights in its own name
which it could hold in trust for reallotment
through sales or subscriptions.
Under
this kind of operation it may be possible
to evaluate the water right in the resale
process and correct defects of ambiguities
that might otherwise continue to cloud
the validity in terms of relative standing
with other water rights in the system. Also,
the State Engineer might find it easier to
impose public interest conditions in approving water transfers out of public trust
ownership than i f the transfer is being
negotiated between individual parties with
strong vested interest concerns. Any holding
of water rights in trust would have to be
consistent with the present "banking" or
"holding" of approved filings practiced by
the State Water Resources Board and the
Water and Power Resources Service (formerly
the Bureau of Reclamation).
It may be
plausible for a state authorized banking/
brokerage system to integrate such holdings
into its more generali~ed operation. On the
other hand, there would be less vulnerability
to criticism about regulating or manipulating
water markets to suit its own ends if the
bank served strictly as an arranger in water
transfers between negotiating parties and not
as a participant in the market itself.

h.
i.
j.
k.
1.

Irrigation Districts
Water Conservancy Districts and
Subdistricts
Certain agencies of the State of
Utah
Certain agencies of the United
States Government
Indian tribes

Under the enabling laws and procedures
set forth, each of the above named entities
(wi th the exception of individual persons.
agencies of the federal government, and
Indian tribes) is governed by its own bylaws
and regulations as to authority, powers,
discretion, and other matters pertaining to
the subsequent management and reallocation of
the water rights.
To the extent that federally reserved
water rights or Indian water rights are
quantified and transferable or exchangeable,
the banking/brokering service could foster
transactions which may include such water.
However, the question of applicability to a
Utah water banking operation is not addressed
in this study.
Coordination with State Engineer
Under Utah law the State Engineer is to
approve all water transfers which fall under
the category of "change in use."
This
includes not only changes in nature of use,
but changes in place of use and point of
diversion as well.
The State Engineer
examines the nature of the transfer with
particular concern for detrimental impacts
that may result to third party water users.

The most significant role of a water
banking/broking entity might be that of a
realtor who obtains listings of water rights
available for sale or lease to prospective
purchasers or lessees.
The entity might
also find it practical and feasible to serve
as a broker of water right options.
During
the period the bank/broker held an option or
a listing of water to be purchased or sold,
the owner could, of course, continue to
use the water.
As with a land realtor, the
water realtor would not become an owner of
any water right interest. Where the role is
pr imari ly a market faci li tator and not a
market participant, the buyer and seller
determine the price and other conditions of
the transaction.

Procedural requirements for making water
transfers are explicit and require formal
applicat ion with the State Engi neer. He
informs interested public about the proposed
change, hears protests from any who feel
threatened by the change, and then approves
or rejects the request. The water bank/broker
service would have to operate in conformity
with these statutory requirements.
The
implications of doing so are analyzed in a
subsequent section on legal feasibility
considerations.

Candidates to Provide a Banking/
Brokering Service

Organizational Alternatives

Under the current legal framework for
water rights ownership and transfer in Utah,
entities which have legal standing as "persons" and are entitled to appropriate water,
and who would thus represent the potential
water banking clientele, are identified as
follows (see Section 73-3 of the Utah Water
Code) :
a. Individual persons or associations
of persons
b. Nonprofit corporations
c. Cities and towns
d. Metropolitan Water Districts
e. Municipal Improvement Districts
f. County Improvement Districts
g. Special Service Districts

The operational requirements and activities of a water banking/brokering service as
discussed in the previous section mark out
the kind of organizational framework needed
to effectively perform the outlined functions.
If the needed capability, authority,
operating freedom, and infrastructure are
available (or readily adaptable) within an
existing organization, there would be little
advantage in creating a new entity for
operating a banking service.
Consequently,
an assessment of the practicality of locating
the banking/brokerage function within an
existing organizational entity is a logical
first consideration.

6

Existing organizations that may be
prospective candidates for the water banking
service are examined amd compared with
respect to certain important credentials
and/or operating criteria shown in the
summary tabulations of Table 1.

Multicounty water conservancy districts,
with already broad functional authorization
and extensive geographic jurisdiction,
may be readily expandable to a statewide
coverage.
However, such entities may lack
the desired levels of political and fiscal
accountability to elected political bodies
that would seem desirable in a state water
bank.

The comparison demonstrates that only a
few existing organizations possess the
breadth of geographic coverage and the
inclusiveness of responsibility for the
various uses and sources of water supply
needed for a statewide banking operation.
Many have long term encumbrances or commi tments which could temper or constrain their
objectivity in operation.
It would be
important for a broker to maintain strict
impartiality in arranging water transfers.

Three federal agencies possess the
technical qualifications for operating
a water banking/brokering service and offer
much experience in information collection
and gener al water management.
However, any
federal agency would be oriented to broad
national policy mandates and could not be
confined to operat ing wi thin the policy
guidelines of the state. Though federalstate coordination and a close working
relationships are possible (and have been
achieved in the past), there is no clear
justification for federal operation of
such a service involving state water rights
exchanges.

Evaluation of Existing Water
Management Organizations
All 16 of the existing water management
agencies or organizational forms shown in
Table 1 are capable of performing a kind of
limited water banking function, and most do
so within the framework of their water right
entitlements.
In order to compare their
potential effectiveness as a statewide water·
banker/broker, criteria for evaluating qualifications for assuming the water banking/
brokering role are presented in question
form in the first column. To be a viable
candidate does not mean an agency should
presently possess all of the desirable features (some are significantly more important
than others).
However, deficiencies in the
more important areas, would seriously subtract from an agency's capability to provide
an adequate water banking service.
Perhaps
of particular importance would be fiscal and
political accountability to an electorate; a
breadth of water supply activity which is, or
could be, readily expanded to be statewide in
scope; and readily subjected to the state
wate~ management policy.

The Utah State Division of Water Res ourcesand Division of Water Rights (Office
of the State Engineer) possess the necessary
qualifications to incorporate a water banking
service within their scope of responsibility.
Ideally, a water brokering organization
should be an independent, objective facilitator of the market process; a facilitator
with no vested interest to protect and not a
participant in the market activities related
to the water supply or consumption.
The
Division of Water Resources possesses valid
filings ,on unappropriated water for prospective projects with which it may be involved.
Further, since the Water Resources Division
may sponsor its own projects under the 1977
Water Resources Conservation and Development
Program and may become a water entrepreneur
in its own right, it may have difficulty
mai~taining the desired image of objectivity
and impartiality.

An analysis of Table 1 indicates that
only seven of the established water management agenCies analyzed possess the desired
potent ial for providing a water bank ing/
brokering service (Special Service Districts,
the State Division of Water Resources, the
Office of the State Engineer, multicounty
Water Conservancy Districts, and three
agencies of the United States Government).
However, most of these agencies have one or
two critical drawbacks.

The Division of Water Rights/Office of
the State Engineer appears to be the most
eligible candidate for a banking/brokering
service from among the established water
management agencies.
To assume such a
service would, of course, entail a broadening
of the mission of that agency; however, there
is significant justification for that expansion in light of the strong functional ties
between the Office of the State Engineer and
the proposed water brokering activity.

Special service districts have limited
geographic and functional constraints that
would be difficult to modify so as to cover a
statewide area.
While water transfers will
be generally confined to the same basin,
there would need to be a statewide organizat ional framework.
Even in areas of 1 imi ted
water trading, the possibility of rather
massive enterprises booming on the scene
would suggest a banking/brokering framework
that is in a state of readiness to perform in
any area of the state.

Alternative Organizational
Structure
The preceding section examined existing
water management entities. Among those
entities was the nonprofit corporation as
embodied in private water 'companies and
mutual irrigation companies.
In such
organizational forms, the nonprofit corporation lacks the potential to be expanded to a
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Table 1o

Comparisons of existing water management organizations in Utah with respect to qualifications for assuming a water banking function °
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tion, but may have the basic framework to
which a water banking/brokering function
could be successfully attached.

water banking/brokering service. The structure and function of a nonprofit corporation
are not, however, restricted to the two
existing forms analyzed.

Administrative Considerations

A nonprofit corporation could be created
and specifically tailored to meet the organizational needs of a water banking/brokering
service.
The legislation defining the
nonprofit corporation (Chapter 16, Section
6 U.C.A. 1953) applies to "mutual irrigation,
canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies
and water users I associations" for the
purposes of "water development, diversion,
storage, distribution or use." They "may
acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with real or personal
property, or any interest therein, wherever
situated."

The administrative structure of a water
banking/brokerage organization would need to
promote operating effectiveness in the range
of activities in which it would be engaged.
In order to maintain public and fiscal
accountability, as well as state agency
liaison, the bank would need a governing
board whose composition reflected these
concerns.
Th is would be true whether the
bank became an appendage of an existing
organization or whether an entirely new
organization were to be created.
Some
members of the governing board would properly
be ex-officio and charged with correlating
banking/brokering activities with administrative agency missions and assuring the
kind of legislative monitoring and oversight
that would be desirable. Regional as well as
sectoral water use representation would be
important for balanced public accountability.
Balanced political affiliation on statewide
boards is customary and perhaps should be a
requirement. Other considerations which are
routinely included in the organizational
bylaws regarding appointments, selection of
officers, etc., would require attention.

The enabling legislation concerning
nonprofit corporations is very flexible.
Clearly, the articles of incorporation may be
structured to meet any peculiar or unique
need provided only that other laws and
rights are not violated in so doing. The
mutual irrigation companies and private water
companies are just two examples of this
flexibility.
There would appear to be sufficient
opportunity to incorporate political or
fiscal accountability into the corporation
since the art icles of incorporat ion or the
bylaws may provide for the election or
appointment of trustees to the governing
board. Thus, the general public could be
provided with an input and an effective check
upon the operating policies of the water
banking/brokering function.

The bank would need an executive officer
to manage day to day affairs under the
guidance of the board. The manager and other
professional personnel should be selected on
the basis of their special knowledge and
familiarity with water management in general,
water transfers in particular, and the
institutional mechanisms that are pertinent.
Individual capabilities required would depend
on the breadth and depth of banking or
brokering services provided.
The marketing
of water rights would require emphasis on
those activities that make information about
water availabilities and water needs broadly
available. This may include various means of
advertising, soliciting, and personal
contacts to locate buyers or sellers of water
rights and to make them aware of market
possibilities.

One existing nonprofit corporation that
could provide a water banking/brokering
service is the Utah Water Users' Association.
The Association would, of course, need more
organizational manpower to provide the
services envisioned, yet it possesses the
breadth of water concern and statewide
organizational coverage that would be des irable, and enjoys freedom from vested
interest which could compromise objectivity.
Water users statewide would naturally be
interested in the efficient and productive
use of the limited water resource.
The
water users' association holds no water
rights or interests in such rights. The
governing board of such an association,
acting as a banker, would have to be at arms
length from actual transactions so that there
would be no conflict of interest.
The Utah
Water Users I Association is presently a
r ather loose kni t and low prof ile organiza-

If public monies are used to support the
banking/brokering function, good records and
documentation of activities would be needed
so that the public value of the bank could be
assessed.
It would be important to know
whether the bank actually facilitated the
water transfer process and whether it accomplished its mandate in a cost-effective
manner.
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III.

HYDROLOGIC/ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS

Water Transfers and Third
Party Impacts

Detrimental third party effects stemming
from a water use change may be in terms of
quantity, quality (physical, chemical,
biological, or temperature alterations) or
timing impairments.
Consequently, it would
be necessary to project the water quality and
timing consequences of any proposed change of
use as well as the quantity impacts that
are generally given more attention in water
right transfers.
While the State Engineer
has statutory responsibility "to prevent
waste, pollution, or contamination of waters
of the state" which would cause injury to
other users, the Division of Health, together
with the Water Pollution Control and Safe
Drinking Water Committees, has been given the
major regulatory responsibility over water
quality maintenance.
Thus, while the water
right would be the normal medium of exchange
in the operation of the water banking/brokering system, and while water rights are the
clear province of the State Engineer, water
transactions through a water broker would
have to be in conformity with water quality
management regulations and programs as
administered by the Division of Environmental
Quality and its Committees on Water Pollution
Control and Safe Drinking Water.

Typically, the transfer of water to a
new use will entail a different complex of
physical facilities to manage the water supply in conformity with the new use requirements.
Since waters of a hydrologic system
constitute a unified and interrelated flow
system, a physical modification at one point
is likely to induce modification in the
quantity, quality, or regimen of flow available to downstream 10cat ions. Uses vary
greatly in what they do with and to water in
the use process. Thus, a change in use may
cause trivial or major effects on other
water users who draw their entitlements from
the common hydrologic (river basin) system.
The investments of all legitimate water
right owners must be protected from injury
caused by capricious manipulation of the
common supply.
Th erefore, wa ter equ i ty
transfers--the central activity of a water
bank ing/brokerage service--must entai 1 a
projection of the physical impacts of any
proposed water transfer.
Accurate physical
projections require an understanding of the
interconnection of all surface and subsurface
waters; an appreciation of the interlinking character of the various flow subsystems
of which a river basin is comprised; and a
knowledge of technological options and their
cost-effective application in the management
of water.

Hydrologic Unity and Water
Use Inhomogeneity
To function successfully, the operating
policies and procedures of a water banking/
brokerage service must be properly harmonized
with hydrologiC and engineering reality.
While this may seem a trite statement, hazy
or incorrect notions about water use dynamics
are quite commonly responsible for decisions
and program initiatives which turn out to be
inconsistent and incongruent with physical
reality.
Some of these faulty hydrologic
notions create unnecessary obstacles in
working out the terms of a water transfer.

The key question in evaluating any water
transfer or change use situation is: will the
proposed transfer of equity interests have
significant detrimental impacts on existing
holders of water rights? Since the State
Engineer must make all water uses a matter of
legal record and provide protection of those
legally established rights, he must be
convinced that a proposed change in use 1)
causes no injury or harm to other water
users, or 2) that hydrologic (or monetary)
compensation has been made to the satisfaction of third parties for any injury sustained. Since such tests are a legal prerequisite to any water right transfer,
the State Engineer seeks good "hydrologic"
and "engineering feas ibi l i ty" appraisal
capability to support his decisions.
Water
rights transactions arranged under the
auspices of a water banking/brokerage
service would be contingent upon resolution
of any third party impact problems.
The
service would have to have capability to predict such impacts from proposed water transfers to the State Engineer's satisfaction or
this assessment would have to be done by the
Office of the State Engineer, as at present.

Perhaps the root cause of most of these
incorrect ideas about water is in the
improper characterization of the water
resource system and the perception of water
uses in the same conceptual framework as
non-water resource uses (such as coal or
oil). One major difference between water'and
most non-water resources is in the nature of
the system "res idua1s. " When resources such
as coal or oil are "used" (i.e., for energy
production), the output or residual products
have an entirely different molecular makeup
than the original substance.
The original
compound is never reconstituted.
However,
water does not change its molecular composition in use. It may change its state (solid,
liquid. or vapor) and its quality (in terms
11

of asso~iated chemical, biological, or
physical constituents) as it circulates
through natural or man-made systems, but
it still remains H20.
Thus, the finite
quantity of water associated with the earth
remains constant and all uses are in fact
reuses from a supply in epdless circulation.
Water is often referred to as a "renewable
resource," meaning that hydrologic cycles are
statistically repetitive so that input
quantities to particular use entities are
renewed as prior input quantities course
through and are discharged in various ways
from any given system.
Outputs from one
geographically or geometrically described
system become inputs to another.
However,
the quantity-quality-timing characteristics
of the incoming supply undergo transformation
in the use process so that effluents, or
residuals, are characterized by changes in
one or more of these basic characteristics.
In accordance with the principle of hydrologic unity, a change in use pattern at
one point has an inevitable ripple of influence to downstream user entities.
This
"hydrologic externality" gives rise to
"economic externalities" in water development
and use.
To ignore, or incorrectly presume
boundaries and boundary conditions that
pertain to interesting portions of interconnected flow systems leads to poor definition of the flow residuals which may
constitute critical elements of supply for
subsequent users. Thus, the meaning ascribed
to such terms as "water use efficiency,"
"water losses," "water conservation," "water
savings," etc. are commonly misleading and
often give erroneous manifestations of what
can be expected to happen when a water
entitlement is transferred from one use to
another. (1)
Thus, the assessment of third
party injury associated with a proposed
water transfer is often frustrated in having
to overcome certain widely held but erroneous
presumptions.

(meaning that essentially all the intake
water is discharged back into the system
in liquid form, i.e., hydro-power and industrial cooling).
Some recreational uses such
as swimming and boating merely make contact
with water in the use process.
Obviously,
this lack of homogeneity-in-use impact
on both the diversion and effluent side of a
water using system presents some significant
operational differences in making water
transfers from one use to another and from
one place to another. Water transfers between
nonhomogeneous users will generally require
adjustment in the flow specifications of the
right so that third party entitlements remain
unaffected.
The nature and extent of the
adjustment is a hydrologic/engineering
determination.
Although water rights are much more
explicit about diversion allowances, every
right has some implicit limitations associated with the discharge or return flow side
as well. Whether points of diversion and
places of use are moved upstream, downstream,
or out of basin, and whether management
measures employed in the original and new use
create different influences on flow patterns
and characteristics are also important
factors to consider.
To summarize, central to the concept of
water banking/brokering function is the advantageous transfer of water equities. Water
transfers and changes in point of diversion,
nature, and place of use require the State
Engineer's approval. That approval is based
on whether projections of the physical
impacts on other water rights is injurious.
If detrimental impacts on third larties
are projected as result of a propose transfer, then some kind of mutually satisfying
compensatory arrangement must be made before
the transfer can take place. The determination of what constitutes equitable hyrologic
compensation, as well as what the specific
hydrologic impacts might be, requires a good
hydrologic evaluative capability.
If an
agent bank/broker provides the full range of
professional services that may be called
into play in any given water transaction,
this evaluative capability would have to be
available through staff or on call arrangements.
Unless an agreed upon water transfer
is backed up by a definitive evaluation of
third party impacts, it is likely to encounter bothersome and time consuming renegotiations as third party complaints are
registered with the State Engineer.

It was previously noted that water uses
vary greatly in what they do "with" and "to"
water in the use process.
Some uses are
consumptive (meaning that water is converted
to a vapor and expelled to the atmosphere,
i.e., irrigation). Others are nonconsumptive
(OSee for example ''Water Banking: How to Stop
Wasting Agricul tural Water" by Soterios. Angeledes,
and Bardach.
Institute for Contemporary Studies, San
Francisco, Calif., 1978, page 1.
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IV.

LEGAL FEASIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS

mUnicipalities to sell excess waters as long
as such sale is not an obligation in perpetuity.
In a 1938 case involving the sale of
water between towns, Judge Wolfe states: "A
city may sell its excess water to outs iders.
Such is not a sale of its water sources or
water rights but water from its system in the
manner it sells to its citizens. "(2)

The intent of this section is to objectively identify potential legal limitations,
conflicts, or constraints to implementation
of the water banking/brokering concept.
In
addition, suggestions are made for possible
ways of dealing with these limi tat ions,
conflicts, or constraints where appropriate.
These suggestions might be useful in considering the implementation of a service but
should not be construed as advocating the
adoption of the banking or brokerage concept.

The implication of this opinion by Judge
Wolfe is that so long as there is no transfer
of the title, or more correctly, the water
right, a transfer of a physical quantity of
water (if determined to be excess) is permissible.
I t seems logical, therefore, to
assume that any municipality could market its
"excess" water through a water brokerage
operation with clear provisions that such
participation does not constitute a transfer
of water rights.
Municipalities would most
li kely have author ity to make thei r own
determinations of what water is in fact
"excess." Court intrusion into this determination would likely occur only i f the
actions of the municipality were deemed to be
arbitrary or capricious under the doctrine of
usual judicial deference to administrative
determinations. In other words, so long as
the city or town does not abase its power
by making arbitrary determinations and so
long as the citizens of the city and town
are supplied with sufficient water at
"reasonable charges,"(3) the city or town
can market the excess physical supply for
certain limited periods. Most cities and
towns have good historical use records
and can combine operating data with available
stream forecast information to determine
whether and how much excess waters might be
offered to others on a year by year basis.
Some cities have kept so well ahead of
demand that they enjoy perennial surpluses.-

This legal analysis is limited to the
current water law in Utah; however, many of
the observations are applicable to other
states which operate under the so-called
prior appropriation doctrine.
Throughout the analysis, the various
alternative mechanisms of banking/brokering
.discussed elsewhere in the report are considered in a comparative fashion in order to
distinguish the differing manner in which
the laws limit or constrain each alternative.
Constitutional Implications of Water
Transfers and Exchanges
There is only one portion of the Utah
Constitution which explicitly relates to the
transfer of water rights.
Section 6 of
Article XI imposes a blanket prohibition on
all "municipal corporations" against all
forms of transfer of water rights except for
exchanges of "equal value. "(I)
While this provision appears prohibitive
of any permanent transfer, the Utah Supreme
Court has interpreted the provision to allow
(l}Article XI, Section 6, reads thusly:
No municipal corporation, shall directly or indi rect ly, lease, se II, alien or
dispose of any water works, water rights, or
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to
be owned or controlled by it; but all such
waterworks, water rights and sources of
water supply now owned or hereafter to be
acquired by any municipal corporation, shall
be preserved, maintained and operated by it
for supplying its inhabitants with water at
reasonable charges: Provided, That nothing
herein con ta ined shall be cons t rued to
prevent any such municipal corporation from
exchanging water rights, or sources of water
supply, for other water rights or sources of
water supply of equal value, and to be
devoted in like manner to the pub lie supply
of its habitants.

Most cities try to provide supplies in
advance of need.
In meeting steadily
increasing demands by periodic quantum
increases in supply, a city experiences
periods when delivery capacity and water
supply exceed demands.
Water could be made
available to others during such perinds.
Making availability known would increase the
relative marketability of the water to

(2}Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 U.88, 80
P. 2d 930. rehearing denied 96 U 104, 85 P. 2d 790,
935.
See also Hyde Park Town v. Chambers, 104 P 2d
222 (1940).
(3}Constitution of Utah, Article XI, Section 6.
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potential buyers.
The municipalities would
not, however, be able to participate in
any banking or brokerage of water ri~hts
wherein the ownership of the right is in act
transferred.

be that so long as the water obtained by
the municipality in the exchange is of some
use or necessity to that municipality, the
exchange is legally valid and not in violat ion of Sect ion 6.
Th is does not mean,
however, that a city or town may make capricious exchanges without judicial scrutiny.
It merely means that so long as the municipality exercises reasonable judgment, the
exchange will be acceptable.
In relation to
the brokerage or banking concept, such
liberal allowance for exchanges would likely
make possible the exchange of water rights
based on such factors as time of use, point
and cost of delivery, treatment costs, and
relative priority of the rights themselves.

Exchanges are a category of transfers
which is much more permissive under this
constitutional constraint.
Under the constitutional allowance for exchanges by
municipalities, there are two criteria or
conditions which must be met by any exchange.
The first condition is that the exchange must
be of "equal value." The second is that the
exchanged water " ••• be devoted in like manner
to the public supply of its inhabitants."
The requirement of "equal value" was
liberally held by the Supreme Court to mean
equal
value.
In holding thusly, Judge
Wolfe sates, "I t i s agreed that the word
'value' in Sec. 6, Art. 11, does not mean
equal money value or equal value on the
market, but equal use value to the community
attaining the waters given in exchange. "(4)
The value of a water right is determined
largely by quantity, quality, timeliness, and
certainty of availability factors. One kind
of use may place higher premi um on some of
these characteristics than would other uses.
For example, it may make little difference
to an irrigator whether his supply contains
300 ppm or 600 ppm of dissolved minerals.
However, it would make a great deal of difference to a municipality with drinking water
standards mandated at no more than 500 ppm
total dissolved solids. Thus, if an irrigat ion right of 300 ppm dissolved solids were
to be exchanged for a municipally owned
source containing 600 ppm (all other factors
equal) it could be of great advantage to the
municipality and result in minor detriment to
the irrigator~
Yet, such an exchange would
probably not take place without some compensatory recognition of the loss in quality to
the irrigation right.
That compensation
might be in terms of dollars or in improved
quantity, timing, or certainty as an offset
to the acceptance of lower quality. However,
an exchange could likely be worked out so
that both parties end up with a net gain in
the exchange process.

The second cons t i tut ional cr iter i a for
exchanging water, that it be devoted to a
"like manner" use, has also been given liberal interpretation by the Utah Supreme Court.
In the first case on this issue, the Court
allowed Salt Lake Ci ty to exchange nonpotable, relatively low quality irrigation water
from Big Cottonwood, Millcreek and Little
Cottonwood Creeks.(6) This ruling was later
endorsed by the court and expressly stated
that, " ••. the water given need not be fit for
all the uses of the waters obtained. "(7)
In summary, given the liberal interpretations of the Utah courts, there does seem
to be a potential for municipalities to
participate to a limited extent in banking or
brokering of water.
Where a municipality
has an obvious excess of supply almost every
year and where the most likely or logical
buyer(s) are not always evident in advance,
it could "deposit"(8) the call-bid option
in the bank wherein any user could bid for
the use for a specified period of time
depending on its needs and willingness to
pay. Where a city or town desires to increase its water supply seasonally while
experiencing surpluses at other seasons, the
municipality may advantageously "deposit"
surpluses in the brokerage stipulating that
it is available on an exchange arrangement.
Other entities which own water rights
(e.g., water companies, metropolitan water
(6)State ex. reI. Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake City,
29 Ut 361, SI P273-.-

Actual use value of water involved in an
exchange between owners depends upon many
complex but often site-specific factors.
Therefore, the courts have deferred, and will
probably cont inue to defer, to the good
judgment of the municipalities involved in
deciding i f an exchange proposal- is of equal
use value. (5)
The implication s~ems to

The power and authority of the city to
thus contract for and exchange its ... water,
which is of inferior quality ..• for a superior quality of mountain water is expressly
conferred by section 6 of the Constitution,
unless it can be said that the trans fer and·
exchange of water as contemplated would fail
to vest the city with ownership and control
of the water received by it in the exchange.

(4)SO P. 2d 930, 936,
(5)Judge Wolfe sums this concept by stating,
"Who can say that under such circumstances the use
value may not be equal? It is somewhat like appraising
the use value of a cow as compared to a horse on a
farm, where both are necessary." SO P. 2d 930, 936.

(7)SO P. 2d 930, 936-937.
(S)This deposit would not in fact be a transfer of the water right itself, but merely an announcement of availability.
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districts, etc.) have no comparable constitut ional prohibi t ions on water r igh ts transfers' and would therefore be subject only to
the constitutional requirement of due
process. The due process clause of the Utah
Constitution(9) coupled with the United
States constitutional counterparts, while not
directly constraining, must be considered in
the operation of a water banking concept.

statutory impediments to initiating a banking
or brokerage system can be resolved, subsequent focus on the more detailed law can
i ron out secondary problems.
Thus, only
those statutory provisions having potential
for major impediments are identified here
wi th some appraisal of how they may affect
the des irable operating object ives of a
water bank as considered in Chapter II.

The State of Utah holds all waters of
the state in trust.(lO) However, the courts
and subsequent law have construed a water
right itself to be a form of property
right. (ll)
Because of this interpretation,
any transfer of water will be subject to the
usual tests of due process. The due process
concern most directly related to water rights
is the general requirement that all potentially affected parties with legitimate
r igh ts have proper and timely not ice of the
proposed action with adequate opportunity to
be heard. (12)

Limitations on Speculation
The normal market place is characterized
by an element of risk and opportunity for
speCUlation.
For capital to be invested in
the purchase of water rights, there must be
'an expected economic return, and the investment is speCUlative in the sense that the
amount of return is not precisely known in
advance.
There is a statutory prohibition against
speculation in water rights which stems from
a concern that individuals not have opportunity to monopolize water in ways that
result in some unreasonable private windfall
gain to the public detriment.
The statute
governing the approval or rejection of applications for unappropriated water requires the
State Engineer to determine whether, " ••• the
application was filed in good faith and not
for purposes of speculation or monopoly."(14)
If the State Engineer determines that an application is for speculative purposes, then
the application must be rejected. The legal
issue then becomes what is judicially defined
as speculation by the courts.

Under current Utah law, these due
process concerns are generally accounted for
by the appropriation and the so-called
change-of-use procedures of the Utah State
Engineer. (13)
If the creation of a banking
or brokerage system required revision of any
appropriation or change-of-use procedures,
due process safeguards would have to be
included.
Statutory Considerations
While many statutes and rules and
regulations will inevitably affect how a
bank i ng/broker age sys tem f unc t ions, th i s
section considers only those statutes which
directly constrain or limit key attributes of the system. If the major potential

The first Supreme Court case to directly
address this issue involved an application to
appropriate irrigation water to lands in
which neither the applicant nor the protestant held any form of legal interest at
the time of the application. (15)
The court
framed the question to be: "Mayan applicat ion be made to appropriate water for a
beneficial purpose so contemplated in the
future?"(16)

(9)Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section
7:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."

The answer of the court was not definitive, but does seem to accept the practical
realities of certain water developments by
allowin§ such applications if done in "good
faith.'
The court's specific language
illustrates the uncertainty,

{lO)UCA § 73-1-1:
"All waters of this state,
whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared
to be the property of the public, subject to all
existing rights to the use thereof."

(lOs ee e.g. R
'
•
onZ10
v. Denver & R10
Grande
Western R.R., 116
604.---rriftllCir. 1940):
"While the corpus of the naturally running water
belongs to the state in trust for the public, the law
recognizes a property right in its flow and use, known
as the usufructuary right or the water right."
at 605.
See also generally
Wiel ~ Water Rights,
Vol. I, 3rd Ed, p 304.

We confess that the question
is open to debate and is not
free from doubt. We have, however,
with some hesitancy, reached the
conclusion that such an application

-v:--u

(14)Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(4).

(12)See generally Chrisiansen v. Harris 109
Ut I, 163 P. 2d 314. Specific to water rights see
Mosby Irrigation
v. Criddle, 11 Ut 2d 41, 354 P.
2d 848.

(15)Sowards v Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P.
1112 (1910). cf: State v Corder, 78 NM 312, 431 P2d
49 (1967). Compare '""GOodwin v Tracey', 6 Utah 2d I, 304
P2d 964.

(13)UCA § 73-3-2 to 73-3-18.

(16)108 P. 1112, 1116.

15

applicant protected in his inceptive right. (19)

may properly be made when it is
made in good faith and with an
actual bona fide intention and a
present design to appropriate the
water for a beneficial use, though
contemplated in the future, and
when it is not made for the purposes of mere speculation or
monopoly. (17)

The real caution in making inferences from
this case to the banking/brokering concept
is that the court focused upon an application
to appropriate and did not consider applicat ions for a change of use which would
be the predominant situation under the
brokering system. To infer that this ruling
would directly apply to change-of-use applications may be somewhat presumptuous.(20)
There remain some gray areas in the judicial
interpretations regarding the statutory
prohibitions on speculation or monopoly which
may pose potential legal constraints on at
least any de facto speculative applications
for a change of use. However, the requirement
of "due di ligence" in placing the water
in question to the intended use can do much
to discourage speculation unless it is too
liberally interpreted or laxly administered.

The reasoning of the court weighed heavily on
the political endorsement of water development and implied a recognition that at
least some "good faith" speculation is
necessary for such a policy to be carried
out.
In the context of this reasoning, the
word "mere" from the Sowards v. Meagher
decision quoted above may be of significance.
By us ing the q uali fyi ng word "mere" before
the word speculation, the court appears
to openly endorse some speculation as long as
the application is not for the sole or
exclusive purpose of speculation or monopoly.
This allowance for some speculation then begs
for some threshold to be identified wherein
any less existence of "good faith" speculation would be grounds to reject the applicat ion.
The court did not clearly identify
such a threshold; however, it did identify
certain speculative actions which appear to
be acceptable under the law.

A different line of reasoning which
considers the extent of the speculation or
"expectation value" of a water right has
evolved from the early water condemnation
cases.(2l)
In these cases, the issue revolved around what is the true market value
of the condemned water right. More specifically, is the right only for that quantity
and/or quality of water necessary to satisfy
the existing beneficial use, or does it also
include in addition the highest possible use
of that quantity and/or quality of water
despite the fact that there has been no
formal application for a change of use?
In
the above referenced condemnation cases, the
view has been that there is some type of
"inchoate right. "(22)
The confusion underlying such reasoning has been what Judge
Wolfe called "... a more fundamental failure to keep in mind the true nature of

One such action which the court endorsed, and which relates directly to the
water brokering concept, is where an applicant appropriator,
••. may comprehend a use to be
made by or through another person,
and upon lands and possessions
other than those of the appropriator.
Thus the appropriator is
enabled to complete and finally
establish his appropriation through
the agency of the user. (18)
In other words, appropriations can be approved for individuals acting essentially
as agents for the ultimate users.
The nearest the court gets to outlining
criteria for determining the legally acceptable degree of speculation is the statement
that, as long as

(9)Ibid, 1117.
(20)This is some judicial support, albeit in
a dissenting opLnLon that the provisions of this
appropriation section applies to change-of-use applications. "rt should be noted that in a case of an
application for a permanent change as compared to a
temporary change the procedure shall be the same as is
provided for in appl ications to appropriate water."
In M(Yle v Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P2d 882,
895 1947).~olfe, J, dissenting in part.)

it fairly is made to appear
that when
work prosecuted
with reasonable diligence and
dispatch ••. and the water applied
to the beneficial purpose for which
the appropriation is proposed, we
see no good reason why the application should not be received and the

(2l)see e.g., Shurtleff v Salt Lake City, 96
Utah 21, 82 P2d 561, (1938); Sigurd City v State. 105
Utah 278, 142 P2d 159 (1943); and M)Yle v Salt Lake
City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P2d 882 (1947 •

(l7)Ibid.

(22)wolfe, J, dissenting in part in Moyle v
Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P2d 882, 895.

(8)108 P. 1112, 1116-1117 citing directly
Nevada Ditch Co. v Bennett 30 or 59, 45 P. 472.
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the right which an appropriator has."(23)
These cases viewed the property right to be
in the water itself and did not properly
perceive the implied or explicit relation to
other users of the same system. As noted in
previous sections, transfers from one use to
another may alter the flow relationships
among the set of users such that existing
rights are affected. Judge Wolfe's view was
that the "... right to change the place of
diversion [or use] is not an absolute or
vested right, but is only a conditional or
qualified one. "(24)
An early U.S. Supreme
Court case recognized this reality in
stating, "The appropriation does not confer
such an absolute right. "(25) Judge Wolfe
sums up his view by stating,

granted beyond 14 years, but they must be
advertized and comply with the rule of
diligence.)
Extensions of time to prove
beneficial use relates to the issue of
speculation in that certain extension requests are based on unfulfilled expectations.
In the context of a water banking system,
if unperfected but approved appropriations
were marketed through the bank, there may be
some legal constraints imposed. In a similar
case on the issue of due diligence and the
conditions allowed for extensions, the
Utah Supreme Court placed a high standard of
showing on any applicant seeking an extension, thusly by requiring a " ... high type of
convincing evidence" supporting such requests
for extensions.(28)

The right to the use of water which
an appropriator carves out from the
general pool of public property is
one for beneficial use only and not
for speculation or traffic ana-such
beneficial use is the basis, the
measure and the limit of the
right. (26)

Forfeiture and Abandonment
Implications
Neither the forfeiture nor the abandonment processes appear to be significant
constraints upon the operation of a banking
system.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly
distinguished between forfeiture and abandonment.
The key case on this issue quotes
Kinney in stating that

With our present ability to assess the
potential hydrologic consequences of a given
water right transfer, it is doubtful that any
effort to obtain a "higher or better" use via
the change application process could constitute an uncontrollable speculative threat,
Therefore, the possibility of enlarging
opportunity to speculate in water rights
does not seem to be of significant consequence of a water brokering service.
Only if the banking/brokering service were
chartered to participate in the market as an
owner of water rights could its operation
interject added potential for speculation and
monopoly.

While upon the one hand, abandonment is the relinquishment of
the right by the owner with the
intent ion to forsake and desert
it, forfeiture upon the other hand,
is the involuntary or forced loss
of the right, caused by failure of
the appropriator or owner to do or
perform some act required by the
statute,(29)
Under current law, the only way in which
a forfeiture will occur is if the appropriator does in fact ""~. cease to use water
for a period of five years."(30) It is very
unlikely that any appropriator would so cease
the use of water while listed or deposited in
the banking/brokering system.
Therefore,
barring unusual circumstances, forfeiture
itself does not appear to pose any significant legal constraint to the operation
of a water bank.

Due Diligence and Use Requirements
An important requirement in any appropriation or change of use application is
that the water described in the application
be continued in a "beneficial use,"
The
statute is very clear that the State Engineer
has the discretionary power to fix a date by
which the water must be put to beneficial
use~(27)
The State Engineer may allow
extensions of time for up to 14 years upon a
"proper showing of diligence or reasonable
cause for delay," (Extensions of time can be

Abandonment, on the other hand, has no
definite time period but is proved by a
showing that the appropriator did in fact
" •• , intentionally release or surrender such

(23)Ibid, 896.
(24) Ibid, 895, citing United States v Caldwell,
64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434, 439-,-- - - (25)Atchison v Peterson,
US507, 512.

(28)Carbon Canal Co. v Sanpete Water Users
Assn., 19 Utah 2d6, 425 P2d 405, 407 096~

20 Wall. 507, 87
(29)Hammond v Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66
P2d 894, 900 (937). See in ~ Drainage Area of Bear
River in Rich County, 12 (ltah 2dl, 361 P2d 407(1961)
citing 2 Kinney on Irrigation & Water Rights (2d Ed)
p. 2020,
1118.

(26)176 P2d 882, 901.
See in re ~ rights
of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah 2d77, 348
P2d 679(1960).

(30)Utah Code Ann. S 73-1-4.

(27)Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12.
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reasonable time,(36) 4) a stated quantity
or flow of water associated with the use, 5)
a specified period or time of use during the
year, and lastly, but perhaps most important,
6) a finding that the use will not interfere
with other valid water rights

right to the public."(31) Further, the court
has held the term "abandon" to mean "to
desert or forsake. "(32) In other words,
there must be a clear intent to totally
relinquish the right.
Renting and leasing
water entitlements is very common in Utah.
Water stock in an irrigation company can be
rented or leased for an indefin<ite time
without any threat of loss by forfeiture or
abandonment.
It appears very unlikely that
"deposits" in a water bank would be construed
as abandonment.

These conditions constitute a permanent
part of the water right description.
If a
transfer in ownership is contemplated and the
new use entails a change in the stated conditions set forth in the original appropriat ion, then such changes would need approval
of the State Engineer.
Where the right is
held by a mutual water company or irrigation
district, any individual transfers within the
company's descr ibed area of application can
be made at the discretion of the shareholders
in those companies. These "share" rights are
sometimes referred to as nonappurtenant
rights as distinguished from individual
rights identified with specified lands in the
original appropriation. However, water rights
in Utah are generally not thought of as
appurtenant in the sense that water cannot be
sold separate from the land to which it
was originally appropriated.
Devoid of the
encumbrance of tight geographical and physical limitations, there is freedom and/or
flexibility under Utah law for transfers
suited to a water banking/brokerage concept.

The Discretionary Authority
of the St<ate Engineer
The administrative aspects of water
right appropriations and transfers have been
statutorially delegated to the State Engineer.(33) The State Engineer has been granted
the very important administrative responsibility to " ••• make and publish such
rules and regulations as may be necessary
from time to time fully to carry out the
duties of his office, and particularly to
secure the equitable and fair apP'ortionment
and distribution of the water. "(34) According to the respective rights of appropriations with this rule making power, the State
Engineer can then develop any system of water
rights transfer which complies with the
statutory framework governing transfers.
Of
course, his decisions will always be subject
to judicial review with respect to compliance
wi th the law and especially in terms of the
above-mentioned due process requirements
under the Constitution. (35)
In other
words, the grant of discretionary powers to
the State Engineer would not in and of
itself constrain the development of a banking
or brokerage system because the framework or
limitations on this grant of discretionary
power came from the laws governing transfers.
Therefore, to identify possible constraints,
these transfer statutes must be analyzed.

Water shares of a mutual irrigation
company can be bought, sold or leased without
a change of use procedure as long as the
transfers are within the constraints of the
original primary' appropriation to the
corporate entity. (37)
There may be little
need for adoption of a water bank or brokerage service for such intra-company transact ions of small organizations.
However,
where the regional jurisdiction is rather
large and composed of a large number of
widely separated shareholders, a central
coordinating and information service could be
useful.
In most cases, the management of
these mutual irrigation companies is well
suited and, In some instances, provides a
form of brokerage or central clearinghouse
for shareholders in the companies. Therefore,
there appears little need for imposition of a
banking or brokerage system into i ntracompany transactions of small organizations.

Initial Appropriation Conditions
Any valid appropriation must meet
certain basic requirements that can be
viewed as limitations on the extent of the
right.
There must be 1) a diversion from a
natural channel or lake, 2) a recognized
beneficial use for the water, 3) the application of that water to said beneficial
use (on a particular parcel of land) in a

The Change-of-Use Procedure
It follows from the previous discussion
that the predominant legal element which may
constrain the operation of a banking or
brokerage system relates to whatever limita-

(31)361 P2d 407, 409.
(32)66 P2d 894, 899.
(36)Sowards v. Meagher,
1112 (1910).

(33)UCA 73-2-l.
(34)Ibid.

37 ut. 212,

108 P.

(37)The rule that intra cOmpany transfers
between shareholders are not changes of use under
the law was clearly declared in Arnold v. Huntington
Canal and Reservoir Ass 'n, 64 Ut. 534, 231 P. 622.

(35)see especially American Fork Irrigation
Company v. Linke, 121 Ut 90, 239 P. 2d 188 (1951).
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tions the change-of-use procedures imply
to the voluntary transfer of water rights.

the state than the previous use, then the
change is justified.(39)

Substantive Factors. Generally speaking,
the statute (section 73-3-3 of the Utah Code)
and the subsequent court interpretations have
been fairly liberal in allowing use changes.
However, strict adherence has been required
to the procedural aspects.

Further and more comprehensive recognition of the necessity of balancing vested
rights against the state policy of progressive development of water was made by the
Supreme Court in a recent case involving
a change of an underground water use by
moving and enlarging a well. The Court,
indicta, builds support from the paraphrasing
of the statutQry policy on water development(40) by stating:

The Utah law provides that "Any person
entitled to the use of water, may change the
place of diversion or use or may use the
water for other purposes than those for which
it was originally appropriated" (Section
73-3-3).
Both permanent and temporary
changes of point of diversion and place or
purpose of use of water are permitted.
Therefore, the basic change use process would
in no way constrain the development of a
banking or brokerage system. The most important potential constraint is that:
"No
such change (of use) shall be made if it
impairs any vested right without just compensat ion" (Sect ion 73-3-3).
In a fully
appropriated stream system, strict observance
of a policy prohibiting hydrologic impairment
may limit opportunities to transfer water
equities.
The courts have used tests of
"reasonableness" in facing the impairment
question recognizing the necessity of balancing the vested rights with the changing
socio-economic conditions demanding shifts in
water use and distribution.

Because of the vital importance of
water to this region both our
statutory and decisional law have
been fashioned in recognition of
the desirability and of the necessity of insuring the highest
possible development and the
most continuous beneficial use of
all available water w:i,th as
little waste as possible. (41) "
In support of this policy, the Court then
declared that where changes of use are being
considered, the State (through the State
Engineer) must balance the vested interests
involved against the policy of development
and highest beneficial use:
(A)ttempting to carry out the
overriding purpose of our water
law, of seeing that all available
water is put to beneficial use, and
at the same time preserve the
rights of individual users to a
particular flow of water, presents
a problem which is perplexing
indeed. Though there is no precise
answer, this writer believes that
the best approximation of an answer
is to be found in recognizing the
necessity of analyzing the total
situation and the balancing of
individual rights in relationship
to each other in a reasonable way
under the circumstances which will

In a relatively recent case, the Supreme
Court focused on the "onerous" burden of a
rigid application of law.
In reviewing a
protested change-of-use application, the
Court stated:
We recognize plaintiff's [applicant
for a change] duty to prove that
vested rights will not be impaired
by approval of their application,
but we also recognize that such
duty must not be made unreasonably
onerous to the point where every
remote but presently indeterminable vested right must be pinpointed. (38)
The Court also drew upon the statutory policy
of beneficial use to decide whether the
change-of-use should be allowed noting that
where the possibility of impairment of vested
rights were somewhat speculative and where
the resulting use is of more net benefit to

(39}239 P. 2d 188, 191:
"And we cannot turn
a deaf ear to every request which reasonably appears
designed for ~ ~ beneficial ~ of ~ not
impairing vested rights, by saying •.• that the proposed
change could interfere substantially with the vested
rights of others." (Emphasis added.)
(40}UCA
73-1-3:
"Beneficial use shall be
the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to
the use of water in this state."

(8)Amerl.can
.
F or k " I rrl.gatl.on
.
.
Co. v. Ll.nke,
.
121 Ut. 90, 239 P. 2d 188 (1950, 191. See also Tanner
v. Humphreys, 87 Ut. 164, 48 P. 2d 484, and Eard~
Terry, 94 Ut. 367, 77 P. 2d 362.

(41)W
C·
Corporatl.on,
.
~ v. Mrrray) ~
2d 97, 458 P. 2d 861 1969.
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2) a publication in the media (one publication for a temporary change or three successive weeks for a permanent change), 3) a
30-day protest period, and 4) the approval
or rejection of the application by the State
Engineer.
At the absolute minimum, this
process requires 60 days and (because Of the
inherent delays), at least 90 days should be
considered the minimum. One of the potential
advantages of a banking/brokering system
would be its ability to expedite water rights
transactions.
However, the processing time
for examining the third party consequences of
that transaction is largely set by law.
Therefore, it may be desirable ultimately to
reexamine the statutory and procedural
elements which govern water right transfers
and changes in use with reference to whether
revision would facilitate a banking/brokerage
operation without loss of public awareness
and opportunity to be heard. A possibility
may be to utilize the "temporary change"
procedure which allows a change use to
proceed without delay while necessary supporting data and evaluations can be thoroughly conducted.
Unless the bank ing/broker ing
system were incorporated into the State
Engineer function, that agency would be leery
of delegating authority to the bank for
making provisional transfers.
Even though
third party impacts seem clear and undisputed, it is not uncommon for some unforeseen challenge to crop up.
Therefore,
any separate procedure for provisional
approval of a transfer under banking/brokeri ng auspices would be questionable as a
device to speed the transfer process.

best serve the above stated
objective. (42)
[Emphasis added. 1
This stated policy of the Court can be
interpreted to mean that the requirement
to protect vested rights is a constraint, but
not an overwhelming one, to the development
of some form of banking/brokering service
established to facilitate water transfer
where changes of use might be the norm.
In
light of these above quoted cases, it would
appear that the statutory requirement to
protect vested rights is a constraint on
certain transfer schemes, but not a prohibitive constraint.
Further, it appears
that the more "beneficial" the proposed new
use is, the more burden the State Engineer
and the Courts will place on the protestor
to show an impairment.
I t seems logical to assume that the
concern for impairment of vested rights is
more benign when a temporary change is
proposed as opposed to a permanent change.
Therefore, the degree to which impairment
must be determined precisely will usually be
less for temporary changes. In both types of
change, however, the State Engineer must make
an investigation and a finding of no impairment. If there is an impairment, the parties
may arrive at a form'of compensation whereby
the State Engineer would permit the transaction to proceed.
Procedural Factors.
While the substantive law does not appear to be significantly
restrictive in allowing changes in use to
take place, the procedural encumbrances
could not be avoided in the operation of a
banking/brokerage system. Under current law
all changes of use must have a 1) formal
applicat ion filed with the St ate Engineer,

Public Interest and Water
Quality Factors
Certain other statutory conditions
pertain to any appropriation of a water
right and apply generally to water transfers.
Consequently, they deserve mention as potent ial constraints applicable to the bank ing/
brokerage concept. For example, water transfers and changes in use must consider public
desirability and concern. Also it is becoming increasingly important to consider the
quality related aspects of any water right
transfer.
Any "conditioning" costs associated with the transfer because of water
quality requirements may certainly affect
the freedom to barter as well as influencing
the negotiated price of a water right.

(42) 458 P. 2d 851, 864.
While this case is
limited to an underground water table, the principle
would seem to apply for all changes from the court's
view.
Indeed, the court directly quoted in support
of its decision aU. S. Supreme Court case dealing
wi th sur face wa ters and holding no priori ty appropriator is absolutely entitled to preservation of
his original stream flow if it becomes "inefficient."
Schodde v. Twin Falls Land! Water Co., 224 US 107.
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V.

INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Water OWnership Hierarchy

and places whereby the likelihood of a third
party impact is increased, objections may be
raised requiring the State Engineer to
determine whether or not the proposed transfer is appropriate.

In addition to the complication that the
inhomogeneity of uses introduces to the water
transfer process, there is a kind of institutional variation among water owning entities
which creates some significant implications
for the water banking concept.

Municipal water utilities do not identify equity interests in their water rights
to customers. The emphasis is on providing a
safe, dependable water service much in the
manner of an electrical utility.
Pro-rata
ownership of the water right is not recognized. Considerations for water transfer or
exchange can only take place at the municipal
government level.
Certain constitutional
restrictions apply to municipal water right
transfers which are discussed in Chapter
IV of this report.

Water rights are awarded to many different kinds of entities (see page 6) ranging
from individuals, groups of individuals,
cities and towns, various kinds of districts,
agencies of local, state, and federal governments, etc. The geographic domain of the
entity to which a water right pertains
may vary from less than 1 acre to several
counties.
There is also great variation in
the range of uses permitted under a particular water right award.

Water Conservancy Districts represent
large and important change agents in water
development and distribution.
As with
municipalities, their water rights generally
involve substantial "blocks" of water which
can, in turn, be allocated under contractual
arrangements to a variety of specific uses.
Districts may be wholesalers or retailers of
water developed under the blanket (block)
water right.
Subscribers of district
water do not acquire a water right per se.
Rather, . they obtain a firm commitment to
provide an agreed upon amount of water at an
agreed upon price for some specific period of
time.
Water Conservancy Districts have
wide latitude in how they may acquire,
develop, and manage water.

Water rights of an individual are quite
specific in terms of the nature, place,
timing, and amount of use. This same degree
of precision commonly applies to the whole of
the water right of a single purpose organization such as a mutual irrigation company. On
the other hand, water rights owned by municipalities or water conservancy districts
allow a multitude of uses leaving the agent
owner free to make and to manage the ind ividual allocations for water use between
and among constituents over time.
Where
water rights vary so greatly in terms of
geographic extent, allowable uses, and the
size, character, and operating latitude of
the appropriator, it is clear that the
resolution with which the State Engineer sees
third party impacts to a particular water
transfer differs vastly from one water right
to another. Where the water right is issued
to an entity acting as an agent for a large
set of water users, that agent becomes the
referee to individual user allocations
and water transfers between and among users
making up its constituency. So long as these
impacts are presumed to be "internal" to the
corporate water right, the State Engineer,
who is concerned about impacts between
rights, does not normally get involved.

The state or an agency of the federal
government may acquire block water rights in
anticipation of projects which may take many
years to construct. Consequently, they are.
frequently given special consideration in
satisfying due diligence ~equirements.
(Ultimate reallocation of these state or
federal agency water rights to some managment
agency may constitute some prescription of
the State Engineer's function.) The point to
be made here, however, is that there are a
variety. of institutional peculiarities which
enshroud a water right which may place
conditions on the ease of transfer of
water and also the extent to which ~he
proposed transfer requires State Engineer
endorsement and oversight. Certain "internal"
transfers and allocations take place continually whose social and economic impacts are
very substantial yet do not require State
Engineer tests of third party impact and
public interest.
This represents a kind of
inconsistency that the bank would have to
recognize and deal with until and unless legislative changes ironed out the variations.

In mutual irrigation companies, the
water right is (in effect) approportioned to
i ndi vidual ownership through issuance of
water stock representing proportionate shares
of the collective water assets.
Thus, the
equity interests, represented by certificates
of water stock, can be bought and sold for
uses and places consistent with the company
charter without requiring State Engineer
approval.
However, where sales represent a
physical transfer of water to different uses
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encumbering
and holders.

Institutional Constraints to
Water Marketing
Water institutions of various kinds are
the mechanisms for transforming the physical
and economic potentials into realities.
Organized to perform specific functions or to
achieve particular goals, institutions
make the decisions, the commitments, and take
the actions which result in the ultimate
regulation, delivery, distribution, and
disposal of water in accordance with specified needs.
If poorly organized, staffed,
supervised and managed; or, if inadequately
coordinated and integrated with companion
institutions; the effectiveness with which
objectives are accomplished may be constrained.
Any such limitations or impediments tend to reduce the value of water
rights and retard free movement according to
market forces.
Institutional factors may
work to impede or facilitate the water right
transfer process, and hence, the brokerage
operation.
Reference has already been made to the
implications of institutional variations
among water owning entities on water right
transfers. Municipalities, Water Conservancy
Districts, Special Improvement Districts, and
all the rest have statutory restrictions
limiting the geographic areas they can serve
and their freedom to transfer, exchange, or
otherwise manage their water rights.
Institutions also have a variety of contractural commitments and indebtedness which
may become a lien upon water rights and thus
restrict their movement in a water market.
For example, a water conservancy district
having long term obligatory contracts of
repayment with the federal government
could only participate in a water marketing
activity so long as transactions could be
made compatible with contractural obligations.
In certain cases, the contractual
obligations will be significant barriers
to water market transfers.
In other words,
if a market exists for the water right
without any such contractual obligations but
not with them, then the logical conclusion is
that these encumbrances are in fact institutional constraints the market potential
and thus, the operation of a water bankIng
system.
Ancillary to contractual arrangements are the loan or bond repayment arrangements which likewise must be considered as limiting the water market potential in certain cases.
The situation is
somewhat analogous to the real estate market
wherein the mortgage obligations and conditions directly affect the marketability of a
parcel of land.
There is some difference.,
however, in that the obligations in the water
resource are usually group obligations

many

different

water

rights

In contrast to the kinds of formal
constraints noted above, there are some
informal constraints which are more difficult
to identify and to assess in terms of impact
on the water banking potential. A viable
and successful bank must have an open negotiation atmosphere within which to operate.
A pure open negotiation process is one
in which all potential participants agree
upon a uniform criteria for assigning values
to the resource.
In the water world, however, value perceptions are sometimes
clouded with cultural and psychological
biases.
The perception of water as the
"lifeblood" of an area may cause a distortion
of the theoretical marginal value of a water
supply.
Or, if water is considered in the
context of a "family heirloom" the market
potential may be constrained accordingly.
This potential for distortion is compounded by the long existence of many independent water management entities throughout
the state and which exhibit a reluctance to
relinquish any vested institutional interests. Many mutual water companies, irrigation
companies, municipalities, etc., view the
water market singularly from an internal
perspective. Sometimes these perceptions
include a strong desire to maintain the
existence of an organizational and operational structure notwithstanding any economic
inefficiencies which might develop over time.
Willingness to buy or sell water within
these entities· can be limited, and at times
eliminated by these cultural per.ceptions
and biases.
This conclusion is not an
argument to remove these institutions.
It is to be considered only as an observed
potential institutional constraint on a
market under a banking system. These barriers
to free negotiation and interchange could
exist both between two potential buyers,
between two potential sellers, or between a
buyer and seller.
Historically, the manner of organization
and original intent of water management
institutions have a strong influence on the
disposition of the membership and managing
authorities.
Th is background can create an
institutional inertia favoring or disfavoring
certain types of water transactions.
The
degree to which these dispositions are
compatible with the potential unencumbered
market will determine the degree to which
these institutions would be a constraint on a
water banking system.
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VI.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CREATION
OF A WATER BANKING/BROKERING SERVICE

The desirability of establishing a water
banking/brokering service is in large measure
determined by comparing the benefits of such
an operation with the associated expenses.
Could the information and expertise supplied
by a banking/brokering entity significantly
reduce the time and expense involved in
negotiating and completing a water right
transfer? What is the level of activity in
water rights transactions in Utah? Would the
existence of a centralized banking/brokering
service actually stimulate more water marketing activity?
These are some of the questions addressed in this section.

(generally for storage facilities) to alter
the timing of availability of the old point
of use to times of need at the new point of
use.
These added costs are only justified
when the potential buyer can obtain commensurate returns. (2)
Since these "conditioning" costs get capitalized into the value
of the water right, a steady upgrading
in value of a water right takes place over
time.
New uses which can justify paying
higher prices, commonly look to enterprises
depending on low cost water (I.e. ap,riculture) for their supply.
To the 'raw
water" costs at the site of current use are
added the "conditioning" costs to obtain the
characteristics needed for the new use.
Professional assistance in evaluating the
total costs of optional water supply sources
could be a valuable service to some prospective buyers.
Providing not only a centralized listing of available water rights
but also providing the capability to appraise
the physical and legal certainty of a right
and to analyze the needed conditioning
requirements for alternate transfer schemes
would gr.eat1y improve the decision calculus
of a potential buyer.
For example, there
seems to be a decided shortage of information
about water marketing potential growing out
of the urbanization process.
Farmers whose
agricultural lands have been subdivided are
often unaware of possibilities converting
irrigation water to urban supplies (either
potable or nonpotab1e components).
Subdivision developers commonly seek a potable
supply derived from an entirely different
water right (perhaps an organization owning
and marketing water for domestic service).
Thus nonoptima1 allocations of water may be
occurring because of the lack of market
information that could be provided through
a brokering service established to bridge
that information gap.

Market Information
The price attached to a water right
reflects the social value of that right to
the extent that the water market operates
efficiently. The more information available,
the more effectively and efficiently the
market will function.
Sellers need to know
the prices that are being offered for water
rights.
Buyers need to know what it will
cost to acquire and adapt a given supply to a
different use.
The capabi li ty to assemble
and analyze all the information which both
buyers and sellers would need in order to
arrive at an appropriate selling price would
be a principal raison d'etre of a water bank.
The presumption of the rational economic
actor is based on his possession of adequate
information and the use of that information
in the pursuit of his self interest. (1)
The value of a water right varies greatly
with its year to year or seasonal certainty,
its location, its quality, and the complexity
and costs of needed facilities and management
measures to place it in use. The buyer of a
water right needs more information than the
se11er--particu1ar1y about costs to "condit ion" any given supply to make its quantity,
quality, and timing characteristics conform
to the requirements of the "new" use.
The total cost of purchasing water is
more than the cost of acquiring the water
right at its current site of use. Additional
costs are incurred to relocate or convey the
water to the new points of use; possible
treatment to bring existing quality to the
desired level of quality; possible compensation to damaged third parties; and costs

Despite informational deficienc~es,
there is considerable act ivi ty in the water
rights market. An indication of the level of
this activity is given by the data comprising
Table 2. The number of applications processed

(l}For a general discussion on price theory
and social values see Friedman (I962) Price 'lbeory
1962, Aldine Publishing Co. Chicago or Ferguson and
Maurice (19 ) Microeconomic Theory.

(2}see Herfindahl and Kneese, Economic Theory
of Natural Resources, for a discussion of production
and marginal cost analysis.

Current Levels of Water
Transfer Activity
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by the State Engineer to appropriate, change
use, and exchange water rights indicates that
individuals are finding new uses that
require new supplies and that established
supplies (rights) are being moved from their
current uses to presumably higher valued
uses.
The market is workin.A through the
framework established by law.(j)

potentially usable rights to new demands.
The information shown in Table 2 does not
constitute a market analysis, by any means,
but it gives some indication of the level of
activity in water use changes.
It is not the province of the State
Engineer's Office to determine that transfers
of rights will result in greatest social
utility. The State Engineer considers social
utility but does not identify and evaluate
alternatives and then allow only that transfer option where social utility is believed
to be maximized.
The State Engineer acts in
the capacity of an impartial judge in evaluating whether a change use request should be
allowed.
To encourage or discourage the
level and character of transaction activity
might possibly compromise that position of
impartiality.

The information in Table 2 is, however,
incomplete.
It does not show how many more
transfers might have taken place if the
holders of the water rights had known of
potential buyers for their right and had
general market information that would have
provided the incentive to place their right
into higher valued uses (permanently,
through sale, or temporarily, through lease).
Nor does the information show whether the
actual transfers represent the best match of

Economic Feasibility of a Water
Rights Banking Service
As has been previously mentioned, the
principal justification for the establishment
of a water banking service is based on the
social benefits of the service exceeding the
social costs.
These social costs and bene-

(3}This may be in contradiction to the California
experience where it is reported that owners "seldom
transfer their waters" and that "water transfers
almost never occur in years of normal precipitation"
(Sotorius et al.).

Table 2.

Applications received, processed, and action taken.

Year

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

534
283
29

588
317
53

599
387
36

659
332
64

795
407
112

1095
477
129

1167
473
113

Applications received:
Applications to Appropriate
Applications to Change
Application to Exchange
Application for Extension of
Time to Resume Use
Application to Clean, Deepen,
Repair & Replace
Total Applications Received

7

13

6

8

21

11

8

180
1033

127
1098

102
1130

74
1137

149
1484

161
1873

129
1890

Action Taken on Application:
Applications Advertised
Protested Application Hearings
Applications Approved
Applications Rejected
Extension of Time Requests
Advertised Extension Requests
Extension Request Hearings

873
155
845
111
1274
56
1274

909
114
983
102
1256
93
253

900
94
961
89
1104
52
178

987
192
956
41
1380
125
313

1327
198
1020
84
1048
58
113

1797
218
1756
36
1174
94
134

1707
210
1495
79
982
85
101
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fits have both public and private aspects.
Those costs and benefits which accrue to
current water right holders or to individuals
placing water rights into private uses
are rightly termed private.
Additionally,
because of the many external effects generated from the private use of the water
resource, the public also receives costs and
benefits without directly utiliz,ing the
water resource.

option for their own particular needs,
reduced acquisition costs.

and

Net benefits generated as a result of
the water banking/brokering service through
allowing the purchasers least cost option
selection is, again, difficult to assess.
The net benefit would be the difference
between what the purchaser might have paid in
the absence of the bank and what the purchaser did pay as a result of water banking!
brokering operation.
This varies from
transaction to transaction and becomes
often a function of the competitive market
effect.
Yet, the aggregate of these price
differences becomes a net benefit of the
water brokering operation.

A cost-benefit analysis of the proposed
water banking service would be difficult to
perform because of the problem of estimating
the net efficiency increase made possible
through a better matching of water supplies
to water uses. The impact of the water bank
would probably not be measured solely by the
increase in the number of water rights
transfers; it would, rather, be in the
increased hydrologic and economic efficiency
of transfers made under conditions of improved information. This makes it additionally difficult to forecast costs and benefits
throughout the entire social fabric.
Thus,
only a limited discussion will be attempted
here.

Through the accumulation of very specialized information and council of an expert
staff, there would be increased efficiency in
the operation of the water market because of
the reduction of informational search costs
by individuals.
For example, an individual
attempting to acquire rights in a given area
currently must advertise, make many personal
inquiries, or commission others to seek out
willing sellers. A limited knowledge of the
water availability and the water right
transfer process would probably limit search
to the immediate area of intended use, thus
ignoring potential supplies from other
feasible transfer sources. Yet evaluation of
multi-party exchanges or other potentials may
result in a more satisfactory solution to the
acquisition problem.
Once the search has
been completed and a seller found, it is
common to obtain legal advice about the
status of the water right and the appropriateness of any transfer documents. If the
bank, by virtue of its accumulation of
information about water rights, were able to
provide this kind of examination and title
verification to the potential purchaser at
less than the customary cost, then the
benefits generated by the banking/brokerage
operation would be significant. Any foregone
income to the legal profession as a result of
this alternate service must, however, be
counted as a social cost of implementing the
banking service.

Costs
The cost of creating and operating the
water rights banking service depends primarily on the extent of the services r.rovided
by the bank. A bank offering only a 'listing
and bid" service would have considerably
lower overhead than one offering the services
of a professional investigative staff.
Nevertheless, the minimum cost would include
overhead for office and office supplies,
expense ac.counts for advertising and travel,
and salaries for the manager and other
office personnel.
The manager must be a capable individual
(perhaps specially trained in the engineeri ng, economic, and institutional aspects of
water management), since his personal knowledge of the water rights activity in the
region would ultimately be a valuable marketable good. He becomes the key figure in the
banking operation.
Middle management and
professional talent would likely be drawn
from either the private sector or from
the upper echelons of other governmental:
agenci es.

In addition to the private benefits,
the public receives benefits as the water
rights market operates more freely to place
water into uses on which society places a
higher value.
In many cases, there is a
multiplier effect as water availability paves
the way for increased production or recreational opportunity.
Private enterprise
generates public benefits through tax revenues, employment, maintenance of a certain
standard of living through economic security,
and other positive external effects. However,
the tracing of these benefit linkages from
greater water use effectiveness resulting
from changes in use is beyond the scope of
this report.

Benefits
The benefits of the water broker ing
operation would accrue primarily to the
immediate buyers and sellers.
Water rights
would move from lower valued uses to higher
valued uses which generally serves the public
interest. Sellers would benefit by receiving
more from their water than they would
receive by keeping that water in their own
production.
The buying market for water rights would
benef i t by having an increased market of
suppliers from which to choose the least cost
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would, in fact, become an agency of the state
government and would be funded accordi ngly.
This approach assumes that so many of the
benefits of efficient water use are public in
nature and distributed in general but nonspecific ways such that the public might
properly subsidize the buyers and sellers in
order to generate these benefits.
In this
case, private benefits would merely be a
convenient by-product of the public benefits
so generated.

Financial Feasibility of a Water
Rights Banking Service
There exist three options in the financing of a water rights banking service.
First, there is the self-supporting banking/
brokering option.
Under this approach, the
users of the service would pay the costs of
the bank's operation.
There would be no
outside funding, taxing capacity, or governmental appropriation.
Among the arguments
for a self-supporting operation are:
1)
the benefits of such a banking service are
primarily private and should be paid for by
those who receive the benefits; and 2)
if the business generated becomes insufficient to sustain its operation it would not
continue as an unessential entity maintained
at public expense.
By adhering to a "userpays" approach, if the bank received enough
income through transfer activity it would
continue to operate; if not, it would be
discontinued as unnecessary.
A seeming
lack of interest by private "water consultants" at the present time may reflect
either a perceived lack of market potential
or a "high risk" element due to inadequate
information. This "high risk" activity would
not compete well with other less risky
investments of the entrepreneurs time and
resources.

A third approach to the funding question
is a combination of the first two; that is,
a mixed source of funding.
Private parties
paying for some portion of the benefits that
they receive as a result of the bank's
operation, and a public compensation to the
bank on behalf of the general public for the
public benefits received as a result of the
banking operation.
In the first two approaches, there is no need to separate and
quantify the public and private benefits.
All are considered either completely public
or completely private for financing purposes.
Yet, in terms of distribution of social costs
and benefits and private costs and benefits
of the water banking service, the mixed
support may be most equitable.
The drawback of having an individual pay
a fee to the bank based on benefits received
from the transaction is in the determination of those benefits and the added costs
entailed in the administration of the fee.
There are of course, a variety of fee options. The bank could assess a fee based on
any or all of the following criteria:
1. Volume of water transferred.
2. Flow rate of water transferred.
3. Costs incurred in investigating and
facilitiating transfer.
4. Value of water in past or new use.
5. Percentage of selling price.

The data from Table 2 on water rights
change use applications provide some indicat ion of the changes going on in water
rights.
However, many individual transfers
and changes take place within the corporate
water right which would not be visible to the
State Engineer.
Some of these transactions
could seek assistance through a water brokering service if one were available. While the
total activity in water rights exchanges
is not indicated by the statistics in the
Office of the State Engineer, it must be
recognized that not all water rights transact ions would seek the aid of a broker. Just
as with real estate transactions, some
buyers and sellers would prefer to work out
the transfer arrangements and instruments
privately.
A crude indication of brokering
potential might be obtained by presuming that
the 130 change applications per year reported
in the 1972-73 period for the Jordan River
region might be a reasonable estimate of
trans act ions funneled through a water bank
servicing that region.
If there were 130
transactions per year with an average cost to
the buying and selling parties of $150.00
each, this would represent income to the bank
of $39,000 from the Jordan River region.
Quite likely, this would represent a marginal
level of income to offset the expenses of
operating the banking/brokering service.
Also, it must be presumed that utilization of
the service would build gradually over a
period of years so that self-sufficiency
could not be realistically expected overnight.

As to whether the buyer or seller should
be required to pay the necessary fee, it
might be desirable to leave this cost allocation to the parties involved as part of the
price negotiations.
Such an approach is
found in the real estate markets.
In those
markets, the participants to a transaction
negotiate nearly all aspects of the transaction, including the basic costs of closing
the transaction. The result is an allocation
of costs based on mutual agreement rather
Fhan arbitrary assignment.
In summary, the decision concerning the
level of public financing of the water
bank ing service should be based on an economic analysis which would trace some of the
public benefit multiplier linkages.
It is
difficult to define what factors are relevant
in determining public benefits and hence
public obligations. Some might see a public
benefit in the same manner that the public
benefits from the increased productivity of a
new business concern or the efficient
allocation of capital in the securities
market, both of which receive some form of

A second approach to the funding of the
water rights banking service would be to
support it with public funding.
The bank
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indirect public
structure.

subsidy

through

the

q uant ify a demand schedule for the services
proposed.
This chapter has merely served to
identify some of the considerations of an
economic and financial nature that might
accompany the creation and operation of
a water bank.
Such considerations should
receive extensive discussion and analysis
before being used as a basis for establishing
a water rights banking service.

taxing

In conclusion, it is difficult to
proceed with a legitimate economic analysis
of the proposed water rights banking service
until more information is developed concerning its role and structure of organization.
Even then, there is no way to identify and
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VI I.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

A low risk approach to initiating
a banking/brokering service may be to begin
wi th a minimum level of service and administrative structure and expand services
and capability as justifiable. For example,
three levels of banking/brokering services
together with corresponding administrative
requirements are shown in Table 3.
It
may be wise to initiate the service at a
minimum level of investment risk and expand
services in logical phases as justified by
experience.
3.
There are no constitutional,
statutory, or regulative elements in Utah
water administration that would seriously
cripple or stifle the operation of water
banking/brokering systems in Utah.
Although
municipalities and water conservancy districts would not be able to dispose of water
rights outside their jurisdiction, they now
commonly contract wi th outs ide users for
delivery of water and participate in the
lease or rental market with supplies for
which they have no immediate use while
awaiting increased demands of continued
growth. However, institutional peculiarities
and encumbrances may create differing influences on the ease of efficiency of transfer of water and also the extent to which a
proposed transfer requires the approval of
the State Engineer.
Differences in debt
status and contract ural commitments associated with specific water holding entities
may limit the market potential of particular
water equities.
4.
Procedural requirements pertaining
to changes in water use, and growing out of
st~tutory directives,
pretty well dictate
the minimum time frame within which a water
rights transfer can take place.
Those elements of the transfer process that require
the acquisition and dissemination of information among parties to the transfer, and
those relat ing to the preparation and processing of the various transfer instruments
could be expedited through services the water
bank/broker could provide.
However, that
part of the procedural process that pertains
to the advising of parties that might be
indirectly effected by the. contemplated
transfer, and provides for the registry and
hearing of protests to the proposed transfer,
would be outside the control of the banker/
broker.
Thus a brok.er service could do
nothing to shorten that portion of the

1.
The evident and predicted rapid
changes in the kind, location, and level of
economic activity in Utah will result in
increasingly active markets for water
rights transfers.
The urbanization process
along with the establishment of a variety of
large new enterprises will foster new water
use patterns and the need to work out water
rights transfers and exchanges. Facilitating
water rights transfers, especially those involving users unfamiliar with availabilities
and the complexities of transferring water
equities, will be an important need.

2. A water banking/brokering system,
could potentially provide a centralized and
specialized source of information about water
availability and water needs. A state of
individuals having technical understanding of
the hydrologic, economic, and legal impacts
and economic externalities that accompany
changes in water use, could be effective in
negotiating cost-effective and resource
efficient matchups of buyers and sellers of
water. The bank/brokerage may provide any or
all of the following:
a) A listing or registry of water
rights for sale or lease, the
location of those rights, the asking
price, and the physical characteristics of the entitlement available
to the public market.
b) A registry of potential purchasers
of water rights shares or leaseholds, the use intended, the
quantity, quality, and regimen
requirements, and the location of
proposed use.
c) Information about local water
institutions, their supply availabilities, their service areas,
storage and distribution facilities,
and potentials for participation
or involvement in accomplishing
specific transfer options.
d) Analysis of the "conditionins"
implications and constraints In
transferring a particular right from
present use to new locations and use
situations.
e) Clarification and possibly certification of legal status and title
of water rights of interest to
prospective buyers.
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transaction time critical path pertaining to
third party inputs.
Compression of the time
path for completing a water rights transaction could only be achieved through legislat ive and procedural changes.
Such changes
would need careful evaluation before adoption
to make certain that important public safeguards are not compromised.

study's criterion for providing a general
water brokerage service. In terms of present
organizational structure (including regional
offices), familiarity with the mechanics and
legal reqUirements of water rights transfers
and changes of use, professional qualifications of present personnel, and ready access
to needed information, the Water Rights
Division of the Department of Natural Resources appears to be well qualified to
assume the water banking/brokering function.

5.
The protection of third party
interests to any water rights transaction is
a central consideration in administrative
procedures pertaining to water rights transfers and changes of use.
Thus, water
rights transactions arranged by a water
bank/brokering service would be subject to
third party impact tests performed to the
State Engineer's satisfaction by the banking
system or by the State Engineer, himself.

Recommendations
1.
Th is study has revealed no major
legal, institutional, or other constraints to
the conceptual feasibility of operating a
water banking/brokering service in Utah at
least for certain markets and areas.
On a
comparative and normative basis, two organizations, one public, the other private, have
been identified as best suited to administer
such a program if initiated.
It is recommended that these two organizations now be
examined in sufficient detail to confirm or
counter this tentative conclusion.
How well
a banking/brokering system could be incorporated or adapted to either of these
organizations should be examined with very

6.
Many existing water organizations
are engaging in de facto water banking/
brokering in one form or another generally
within rather restricted geographic domains.
Of the array of water organizations and
institutions operating in Utah which might
operate such a system on an integrated
statewide bas is, the Of fice of the State
Engineer (public) and the Utah Water Users
Association (private) appear to best meet the
Table 3.

Summary of water brokering and banking functions. a

Function Levels
LEVEL I
Centralized Listing Service of
sale and rental offers and
purchase requests
LEVEL II
Solicitation of sales and purchase offers and dissemination
of collected information to
selected agencies, water user
groups, industrial promotion
agencies and other parties;
assist and advise in identification of water right record
status and character, priority
of right to other rights (not
a legal opinion).
LEVEL III
Preliminary identification of
third party impacts of transfer
or exchange and survey of
mitigation or compensatory
schemes for resolving transfer
problems; preliminary analysis
of water transfer conditioning
costs; assemble and disaggretate
"packages" of water rights to
meet the needs of large and
small users.

Administrative Requirements

Clerical/Non-technical

Other Considerations
Contact and negotiation at initiative
of potential buyers and sellers

Clerical/Managerial with knowledge of
local water conditions, information
dissemination procedures, background/
experience in water related administration procedures, and familiarity
with Utah system of water rights
management to assist with buyer and
seller negotiations.
Policy determined by an indepen-.
dent and disinterested board to
insure public accountability.

Broker fees established by agreement;
status identification according to
State Engineer Determinations,
Judicial Decrees, Adjudications,
supplemented by correct right holder
records and subject to the interpretation of State Engineer.

Clerical/Managerial/Professional
providing capability in hydrology,
hydraulic design, law, economics, and
·financial analysis with regional or
statewide support staff possessing
detailed knowledge of user needs and
potential supply sources and ability
to organize and coordinate large
scale information exchanges between
negotiating parties; experience in
evaluation of water rights transfer
impacts. Policy determined through
a disinterested board to insure
public accountability.

All transfer or exchange arrangements
would still require State Engineer
approval, third
right of
protest, and right
appeal by all
parties; services made available
would be optional to, or suppleme~tal
to, private professional services.
Work with water rights "packages"
would be offered on an "as needed"
basis to enhance competitive market
forces through improved information
availability to all ~oncerned parties.

aAII activities subject to the requirements and limitations of Title 73 U.C.A.
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specific reference to such factors as basic
mission, operational mode, operating policies, organizational structure, fiscal and
budgetary implications, and the public
distribution of costs and benefits associated
with the service.

give emphasis to the brokering role. This is
the most readily justifiable component.
In
addition, brokering is not a major departure
from current administrative practices.
Decision to add the banking dimension could
be guided by experience without risking
significant up front resources in establishing a more comprehensive set of services.

1. If the Office of the State Engineer
assumes the management of such a system,
there would probably be some necessary
statutory and resulting organizational
changes in the office.
Generally, these
changes should clearly segregate the current
adjudicatory functions and the banking/
brokerage functions.
This segregation would
mi nimi ze the potent ial for conflicts of
interest within the Office.

3.
I f one or the other of the above
organizations desires to initiate the banking/brokering service, it is recommended that
some initial financial support funds be
requested from agencies such as the Office of
Water Research and Technology, or the National Science Fo~ndation, who have incentive
programs for trying out or demonstrating the
worth of implementing innovative techniques
for improving capability to manage water
resources.

2. Should a decision be made to implement a banking/brokering service, it is
recommended that, initially, the operation
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